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It seems a widely accepted truth that only the one to whom a 
wrong has been done can forgive that wrong. This is sometimes called 
the victim’s “right” or “prerogative” to forgive. The claim that only 
victims can forgive can be treated as a conceptual truth, true by the 
definition of what we call “forgiving.” But what we mean by “forgiving” 
is in dispute at the heart of this question (and others). So I am 
inclined to think of this truth, if it is one, as a claim that results from 
understanding what forgiveness involves, and the real human 
conditions, costs, and effects of its being granted (or denied).  
 
Several philosophers, however, have recently been drawn to 
defending the reality and importance of “third party forgiveness” 
(3PF), the scenario in which A forgives the offender B for something B 
did to the victim C, where A is not plausibly seen as a fellow victim, 
and where A forgives B on A’s own behalf, not on behalf of C or 
anyone else who might be a victim of the wrong. In this paper, I am 
going to look in particular at philosopher Glen Pettigrove’s defense of 
3PF (Pettigrove 2009). Pettigrove’s is the clearest and most direct 
defense, and studying it helps to show that the issues are not 
conceptual ones of the “logic” or “grammar” of forgiving, but rather of 
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understanding what goes on in forgiving, why it is necessary, and why 
it is hard.1 I will defend the victim’s prerogative or unique standing to 
forgive, not only against Pettigrove, but in general against the claim 
that third parties can forgive, where third parties are those who have 
suffered no wrong. My argument, in bald form, is that wrongs that 
require forgiveness inflict severe and inescapable costs of distinctive 
kinds upon victims. It is profoundly unjust that victims should have to 
bear these costs, and impossible for wrongdoers (even where willing 
and repentant, and even where already punished or having made 
amends) to undo or erase them. In forgiving, victims must absorb 
some, and often most or all, of these costs. It is precisely this plight 
inherent in the situation of the victim (and the wrongdoer) that makes 
forgiveness so hard and so valuable, but it is precisely this plight that 
“third-parties” do not share.  
 
At the same time, I recognize that those proposing third party 
forgiveness are trying to reveal something important about forgiveness 
in actual contexts where responding to serious wrongs has emotional, 
material, social, and moral stakes for those beyond the victims of 
wrongs and the wrongdoer. Even if it is solely the victims of wrongs 
who are entitled to and able to forgive those responsible for the 
wrongs, there are significant, even essential, roles played by third 
parties – where these are neither victims nor wrongdoers, and where 
these can include intimates, friends, and strangers – in making 
forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable. They can also make it 
difficult, punishing, or empty. That is why “third parties” matter to 
forgiveness. How they do so, I undertake to explain.  
 
I. Pettigrove on Third Party Forgiveness 
I begin with Pettigrove’s clear and direct positive argument for 
3PF. The argument is:  
 
1. Moral wrongdoing provokes hostile reactive attitudes, 
including resentment and hatred of wrongdoers, and forgiving 
commonly involves overcoming these negative attitudes.  
2. Wrongdoing tends to disrupt relationships, creating 
estrangement and distance among persons, and forgiving 
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commonly involves repairing relationships disrupted by 
wrongdoing.  
3. Wrongdoing invites negative reflection on the character of 
wrongdoers and forgiving involves positive revaluation of the 
character of wrongdoers.  
4. While overcoming negative reactive attitudes, repairing 
disrupted relations, and revaluing wrongdoers’ characters are 
none of them individually necessary for forgiveness, they seem 
to be jointly sufficient to have forgiven.  
5. Persons other than a victim of wrongdoing can engage in 
each of these activities, and sometimes engage in all of them, 
with respect to a person who has wronged another.  
6. Therefore, persons other than victims of a wrongdoing can 
forgive the one who has done that wrong.  
 
Pettigrove’s positive argument draws attention (as many 
accounts of forgiveness do not, but proponents of third party 
forgiveness invariably do) to the intricate social web in which 
wrongdoing reverberates around the victim(s) and the wrongdoer. He 
also rightly avoids the mistaken but prevalent view that resentment 
toward a particular wrong can only be experienced by a victim of 
wrong, although I offer a different account of this later (Pettigrove 
2009, 587). However, even if one accepts the premises of Pettigrove’s 
argument, the argument alone cannot close the case for 3PF. One can 
concede that those other than victims wrestle with negative reactive 
feelings, relationship rifts, and convictions of deficient or bad 
character, yet deny that what they do in overcoming these is forgiving, 
precisely because one believes, for other important reasons, that 
forgiveness is something only victims can do. So the argument results 
only in a stalemate.  
 
Perhaps for this reason, Pettigrove also undertakes to rebut 
three representative lines of argument against 3PF.2 First, there is the 
argument that forgiveness is like cancelling a debt, and only the 
person who is owed the debt can cancel it. He finds unfortunate the 
“image of social life in which we are all moral bookkeepers” (Pettigrove 
2009, 584). Were we to accept the analogy, however, the argument 
ignores the reality of third party debt cancellation, as in cases of 
bankruptcy and arbitration. Second, there is the argument that 
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forgiveness is overcoming or forswearing resentment, and only the 
victim can experience the resentment that forgiveness must overcome. 
While it has become a common claim, following Peter Strawson, that 
resentment is nonmoral anger felt at wrongs to oneself, Pettigrove 
rightly rejects this view of resentment.3 He adapts Bishop Butler’s view 
that resentment is a stronger, more persistent, and more partial (i.e. 
less objective) kind of indignation that, while characteristically felt at 
wrong to oneself, is also commonly experienced at wrongs to others 
about whom one cares or with whom one identifies. On this view, third 
parties can experience their own resentment at wrongs to others, so 
3PF does not incoherently suggest that third parties overcome 
someone else’s resentment, or that in overcoming their own 
resentment they forgive for or in place of the victim. Finally, there is 
the argument that only the victim can forgive, because only the victim 
can judge or decide that his or her relation with the wrongdoer is (or 
can be) restored. In response, Pettigrove notes that we as third parties 
sometimes find ourselves estranged from wrongdoers because of what 
they have done to others. Once estranged, we find ourselves with our 
own strained relationship to mend. Pettigrove does not deny that third 
parties might face different considerations than victims about whether 
to forgive. For example, a third party’s continued anger and 
estrangement from the offender might serve as a valuable and needed 
supportive message to the victim that she or he is worthy of respect 
that the wrongdoer did not show, or it might serve as a warning to a 
wrongdoer who might still threaten the victim. These are differences in 
motivation or reason to forgive or not to forgive in particular cases, 
not differences between those who can forgive and those who cannot.  
 
Pettigrove rests his defense of 3PF on “the functional and 
experiential similarity” between what victims and third parties do 
(together with the – philosophically inconclusive – availability of such 
everyday expressions as “I cannot forgive her for what she did to 
him!”) (Pettigrove 2009, 594). He claims this makes it reasonable to 
see them as doing the same thing, albeit perhaps from distinctive 
positions that introduce some distinct normative considerations. 
Pettigrove believes other features also recommend his account. He 
says it is faithful to the “phenomenology” of our responses to wrongs 
done to others. It seems to me, however, that victims of wrongs and 
those who care about them may well be feel baffled, betrayed, or 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 2013): pg. 495-512. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to 
be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
5 
 
insulted by the presumption of would-be third party forgivers; 
offenders who are “forgiven” by those they did not harm might be 
impatient or indignant, as well.4 That phenomenology, too, requires 
explanation. Pettigrove believes 3PF clarifies the ethical 
appropriateness of forgiveness and apologies, but this is true only if he 
is right about 3PF. Finally, and seemingly most important, he thinks 
3PF acknowledges our interconnected lives. In the closing sentence of 
his paper, Pettigrove says, “...a person’s forgiving and readiness to 
forgive depend not only on states internal to that agent but also on 
relations between that agent and significant others around her, a set 
that includes but is not exhausted by the wrongdoer” (Pettigrove 
2009, 599). With this, I very much agree, but I do not believe 3PF is 
the right way, descriptively or morally, to honor this insight. What I 
need, however, is a strong argument for what, exactly, the defender of 
3PF gets wrong.  
 
II. Hieronymi’s Limited Account of Forgiveness  
 
To start, I avail myself of Pamela Hieronymi’s perceptive but 
limited account of forgiveness. Hieronymi offers an account of what 
forgiveness does that explains why forgiving becomes reasonable in 
those cases where the offender apologizes (Hieronymi 2001).5 The 
puzzle is that forgiveness is only needed if it remains true that the act 
in question was wrong; that the wrongdoer can be legitimately held to 
our expectations, and is responsible for his behavior; and that the 
victim herself did not deserve this treatment. If any of these 
judgments is given up, then we lack an offense, an offender, or a 
victim. Yet if the three judgments of wrong action, responsibility of the 
wrongdoer, and moral worth of the victim are warranted, Hieronymi 
says, “our first response is, and ought to be, anger and resentment” 
(Hieronymi 2001, 530). So, how can the apology give the victim a 
reason to relinquish resentment while leaving these three judgments, 
and the need for forgiveness, intact?  
 
Hieronymi’s explanation is the resentment that forgiving 
overcomes is a sort of “fight response” (Butler called it “a weapon”); 
more specifically, it is a protest of “a past action that persists as a 
present threat” (Hieronymi 2001, 546). Resentment responds not only 
to the judgments of wrong, responsibility, and victim worth, but to the 
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additional threatening claim implied by a wrong action: that the victim 
can be treated this way. The wrong action makes this claim, the claim 
constitutes a threat, and the threat “persists in social space” unless 
and until it is rebutted or undermined (2001, 550). One could deflate 
the threat by denying that what was done was wrong, or that the 
wrongdoer is responsible, or that the victim deserved better, but then 
there is nothing left to forgive. If the facts of wrong, responsibility, and 
the victim’s worth stand, however, there is something to protest and 
resentment is the emotional expression of that protest. Resentment 
“fights the meaning of the past event, affirming its wrongness and the 
moral significance of the victim and the wrongdoer” (2001, 547). 
When the wrongdoer apologizes and repents, however, she retracts or 
undermines the threatening claim, so the protest that is resentment is 
no longer fitting.  
 
It might seem here that Hieronymi’s account opens the door to 
3PF, since it seems that others’ protest might also express itself 
emotionally as resentment, putting them in a position to forgive by 
overcoming or forswearing their own resentment. But there is more to 
her account. Solving the puzzle of how apology makes it reasonable to 
let go of resentment raises another puzzle in turn: if the apology 
retracts the implied claim and removes the threat, what is left for the 
victim to do in forgiving? Hieronymi suggests two remaining roles for 
the victim. First, because our identities and the meanings of our acts 
are “thoroughly social,” not the sole property of the offender, the 
offender needs the retraction of the threat she has posed to be 
“ratified” by others, and in offering forgiveness, the victim “joins 
forces” with the wrongdoer decisively to change the meaning of the 
wrongful act (2001, 550). Second, Hieronymi reminds us that 
regardless of the wrongdoer’s remorse, contrition, or repentance, 
serious wrongs leave damage of physical, emotional, material, or 
social kinds. While the wrongdoer’s heartfelt retraction might dispel 
the threat implied by her treatment of the victim, she usually cannot 
repair all the damage, and in many grievous cases, she cannot repair 
any of the damage, her wrongful act has done to the victim. She can, 
so to speak, retract the threatening insult but not the injury. “With 
forgiveness,” Hieronymi claims, “the offended agrees to bear in her 
own person the cost of the wrongdoing and to incorporate the injury 
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into her own life without further protest and without demand for 
retribution” (2001, 551).  
 
Although Hieronymi has little to say on this second point, it is 
central to seeing what is wrong with the idea that third parties can 
forgive, whatever else they may and must do. The fact that her 
account is limited to cases of repentant and apologetic offenders 
actually sharpens the point. It drives home the fact that even when 
the wrongdoer does everything she can do to own up, apologize, 
atone, and make amends, any serious wrong pitches its victim, 
without any choice in the matter, into a situation fraught with distress 
and harm; where the harm is severe, the response may include rage, 
mistrust, despondency, terror, or grief. Hieronymi reminds us that 
“Forgiveness is not simply a revision in judgment or a change in view 
or a wiping clean or a washing away or a making new. Someone will 
bear the cost in his or her own person. The wrong is less ‘let go of’ or 
washed away than it is digested or absorbed” (2001, 551n39).  
Here lies the core of truth in the “debt model” that Pettigrove 
derogates as an image of social life “in which we are all moral 
bookkeepers who are busy keeping a tally of what we owe and what 
we are owed” (Pettigrove 2009, 584). Grave wrongs done to us can 
deprive us of important goods (such as trust, self-confidence, ease, 
security, or people and things we love) and they saddle us with 
predicaments that range from difficult and unsettling to disastrous and 
life-changing. Someone else has caused this to happen to me; I had 
no choice, but it is I who must struggle. This is an experience at the 
root of a simple sense of justice: I should not have to “pay,” and 
someone else should.  
This intuitive and (so far as I know) universal human sense of 
justice can propel either retributive or reparative demands, but either 
sort of demand insists that the wrongdoer not leave me with the costs 
she has caused me to bear. It is why forgiveness of terrible wrongs 
can be moving, admirable, or even astonishing, and why the ability to 
give it is often seen as virtuous, since it may require generosity, 
compassion, courage, equanimity, or resilience. It is why forgiveness 
is often spoken of as a gift, even when wrongdoers apologize and offer 
amends. It is why it seems trivializing or ridiculous to speak of 
“forgiving” someone for negligible wrongs or for wrongs that do little 
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or no harm. In trivial or slight cases, apology to the offended parties 
may still be appropriate and necessary, as a display of 
acknowledgment that rules have been broken or as a show of respect 
where some consideration has been lacking. But for one mildly 
offended to represent himself as forgiving the offender where there is 
no harm or only slight cost is overdramatizing or excessive – that 
would indeed be an unfortunate form of scorekeeping.6  
 
The reminder of “cost” brings out the full impact of serious 
wrongs among human beings, where damages of wrongdoing are 
never just washed away, even when there is retribution or reparation. 
This is why 3PF hangs somewhere between incoherence and insult. 
Only a victim is left with the damage; that is what it is to be a victim, 
and that is at the core of the problem to which forgiving is a response. 
The fact that significant damage can propagate through our social and 
emotional bonds (to the families of murder victims or to the members 
of the group targeted in a hate crime) is what makes for talk of direct 
and indirect, or primary and secondary, victims. But to represent 
oneself as forgiving just because one is aware of a wrong and enters 
into the fellow feeling of resentment, is myopic, or even self-indulgent 
or presumptuous. It is as if one treated one’s moral responses of 
indignation or outrage at wrongs to others as a kind of harm one 
suffers, or worse, as a kind of harm in some way akin to the damage 
with which victims of serious wrongs struggle.  
 
Hieronymi’s point about absorbing damage tells against 3PF, 
although her discussion of the role of resentment in forgiveness 
initially looked as if it might have permitted it. If resentment is the 
emotional expression of protest against what the wrong implies, and if 
Pettigrove is right, as I also think, that resentment at wrongs is not 
confined to victims, the account might seem to favor 3PF in the 
following way. Wrongs create resentment, not only in victims; the 
function of resentment in the economy of shared moral life is to 
protest the demeaning message the wrong implies; all those who feel 
resentment effectively join in the fight to protest that message, 
pending its retraction, putting all resentful parties in the position to 
forgive; so, insofar as forgiveness involves relinquishing resentment 
for the right kind of reason, the wrongdoer’s repentance provides all 
resentful parties with the right reason to forgive, since the wrongdoer 
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is retracting the demeaning message and asking others for the 
ratification of that retraction in social space. 
The fact that the victim alone must accept and absorb many 
kinds of damage in forgiving, however, decisively blocks that 
implication. But Hieronymi gave two reasons why the victim of wrong 
has something important to do in forgiving, even when resentment is 
no longer fitting. Hieronymi says the wrongdoer needs the victim to 
“ratify” that the threat implied by the wrongdoing has indeed been 
retracted. But this invites the question: why, on Hieronymi’s account, 
is forgiveness by the victim so weighty or decisive in “ratifying” the 
offender’s retraction of the demeaning message, and thus in making it 
reasonable to give up resenting what the offender has done? If 
resentment is correctly explained as a protest of the threatening 
message against the victim’s standing that is the meaning of the 
wrongdoer’s act, and if the meaning of what we do is “thoroughly 
social,” and the retraction of the message requires “ratification” by 
others, why is the victim’s forgiveness either necessary or sufficient for 
the retraction to be ratified? Unlike the absorption of costs, the 
retraction of implied moral insult does not seem to belong exclusively 
or specially to the victim. Indeed, if the wrongdoing can actually 
threaten the victim’s standing, can the victim alone neutralize this 
threat, even if the wrongdoer repents? Conversely, cannot others see 
to it that the demeaning message is “contradicted” by their show of 
respect for the victim and their repudiation of the wrongdoer’s act? 
Cannot others, standing together and with the victim, do this to an 
extent that the victim alone could never do? Something in her 
explanation of the nature and role of resentment is not quite right.  
 
III. Getting Resentment Right: A Revised Account  
 
Hieronymi’s point that forgiveness requires the victim to absorb 
damages without or beyond retribution or amends is independent of 
her particular account of resentment. The victim’s burdens of 
unrepaired or irreparable damage are something any account of 
forgiveness must recognize as the part of the setting for forgiveness 
and a good part of what makes forgiving arduous. The nature of 
resentment, and its role in the economy of moral relations and 
responses, however, has some special importance in appreciating how 
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third parties matter. In this section, I hope to sort out some 
connections among wrongs, resentment, offenders, victims, and third 
parties. In the following section, I will return to the emotional situation 
of the wronged party, and to the consequential roles that third parties 
can play with respect to both the victim and wrongdoer. I aim to leave 
forgiveness to victims, but also to honor our interconnected moral and 
social lives.  
 
My own account of resentment, developed in detail elsewhere, is 
that resentment is a reactive attitude that arises in response to the 
conduct of other moral agents that is perceived to violate norms of 
many types (Walker 2006b, 110-50). Important for my view is the 
ubiquity of resentment; this rebuking anger extends widely throughout 
social life. Resentment is certainly a common response to perceived 
wrongs to oneself, but it extends to wrongs done to others. 
Importantly, it extends to wrongs both to others about whom we care 
and to others whom we do not know. We can resent contemptuous 
treatment we witness visited on a stranger, and we can resent abuses 
of power or violence toward innocents we learn about in the news. But 
resentment ranges wider still. People frequently resent victimless 
transgressions of social norms. They resent what they believe are 
unacceptable forms of attire and hairstyles; what they see as 
inappropriate behavior in public places. They resent others who talk 
too loud and too long; bring “foreign” customs and languages into 
their familiar spaces; act too friendly or intimate in conventionally 
impersonal exchanges; or act outside or above what is assumed to be 
their “place.” The vast field of resentments at apparently victimless 
offenses to presumed social order has a unifying explanation. 
The unifying explanation is that resentment is the reactive 
emotion in human beings that aims at policing compliance with norms 
generally, and not only moral norms. It aims to keep people inside 
bounds and at their stations, where the boundaries and places are 
defined by norms that those who resent believe are authoritative for 
shared life. Pettigrove, who uses third party resentment along with 
third party reconciliation and revaluation of wrongdoers, to support 
3PF, correctly insists that resentment rises to wrongs done to others, 
and not only to wrongs done to ourselves. He sees that we resent 
wrongs done to others with whom we are personally connected, linking 
this to Butler’s description of resentment as an especially partial (not 
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impersonal or disinterested) kind of anger. But one of his own 
examples of other-regarding resentment does not fit his view of 
resentment as essentially “partial.” In his example, a “compassionate 
observer” – a U.S. citizen who resents mistreatment of workers in the 
maquiladoras on the border about whom he reads in the newspaper – 
is supposed to be moved to resentment by a vivid portrayal that 
incites his own sympathetic character (Pettigrove 2009, 587). A case 
like this, however, does not fit the mold of partiality. Those moved to 
resentment by reports of distant wrongs need not be especially 
sympathetic, for they need only care about the moral principle at 
stake; and the account that mobilizes their censure may be a factual 
report rather than a dramatic narrative or moving depiction.  
 
There is a better explanation of the whole range of resentments, 
and it is this: resentment is anger that responds rebukingly to those 
believed to violate shared norms. Resentment, in “protesting” the 
violation, defends both the authority of those norms and the resenter’s 
own standing as a competent judge of the normative order. The sense 
in which one takes “personally” what one resents is compatible with 
this understanding, but not in the sense that one must see a 
normative transgression as a wrong to oneself, or even to those with 
whom one identifies or about whom one cares. On the whole, human 
beings take the normative structures on which they depend seriously, 
where these structures include basic moral precepts, rules of etiquette 
or manners, norms of appropriate attire, modes of address, or 
conventions about giving and receiving gifts. If we cease to take 
norms seriously, the authority of norms erodes. This makes 
resentment – a norm-enforcing response – a central reactive emotion 
for intensively norm-instituting social beings. My view comports with 
Butler’s enduring point that resentment is a “fellow feeling” that rises 
in defense of others as well as ourselves, but it manifestly goes 
beyond injury or injustice. Where there is wrong or injustice, even 
when it is done to ourselves, the resentment rises to the defense of 
those norms that define the action as wrong, the actor as responsible, 
and the victim as worthy of consideration. The norms on which we 
rely, moral and nonmoral, not only protect us, but coordinate a variety 
of expectations in social life.7  
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Hieronymi is thus right to see resentment as serving to protest 
a threat. Resentment is a kind of anger, and since in its overt 
expression it is pointed anger, accusing and rebuking an offending 
party, resentment is itself a spontaneous counterthreat.8 When the full 
range of evident resentments are considered, it appears that 
resentment is a natural and indispensable response that aims at 
policing shared life by rebuking violations of norms across a great 
variety of moral and social contexts. Resentment always invokes some 
presumed norm and at the same time asserts the resenter’s standing 
as a competent judge within the community whose norms these are. 
The “partiality” in question in resentment is not essentially partiality to 
self and others, but consists in our caring about our security in a 
community with rules we can rely on, and our confidence in asserting 
the rules of a community we consider our own. Resentment presumes 
we are bound together and reinforces our normative ties.  
 
The rules or norms resentment enforces are a common 
possession, or at least they are assumed to be shared by one who 
resents a violation. I believe my explanation of resentment is faithful 
to the facts, but in the present argument it has another virtue: it tells 
us why those not wronged, or not even connected to those wronged, 
often feel a stake in the enforcement of norms. Resentment from 
others toward a wrongdoer does defend a victim of wrong, but it does 
more. Resentment or indignation – like Butler and Adam Smith, I do 
not distinguish these – serves the vital function of affirming the worth 
of the victim, while also reasserting the authority of the norm and the 
responsibility of the offender. When wrong is done to someone, then, 
the failure of others to be moved to the censure expressed by 
resentment is an abandonment of either the norm, or the 
responsibility of the offender, or the victim. All of these are at stake: 
others’ resentment stands with the victim, upon the norm, and against 
the offender (pending excuse or justification). Failure to so stand 
signals that one or more of these are something for which others are 
not prepared to stand up. The net effect in the economy of a life 
organized – or better, scaffolded – by shared norms, is that no 
individual can uphold the structure alone, yet any individual is exposed 
to actual or potential harm if the structure (or some structure) is not 
maintained by the actions and responses of enough others. Whether 
the rest of us take up our proper roles does affect, although it can 
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never determine and should not try to supplant, what victims find 
themselves able or willing to do in the way of forgiveness.  
 
IV. Costs to Victims and Third Party Roles  
 
Third parties have nothing to forgive, but have key roles in 
affirming norms, sanctioning offenders, and vindicating victims. 
Victims alone can forgive, but they can typically do little all by 
themselves to affirm shared norms, authoritatively sanction offenders, 
and to vindicate themselves in, as Hieronymi puts it, the “social space” 
in which the messages of right and wrong, responsibility, and moral 
worth circulate. What third parties can do in the wake of wrongdoing is 
distinct from what victims can do. What third parties can do has the 
power to thwart or support what victims might do, including deciding 
to forgive, absorbing the costs of wrongs without further demand or 
repayment. We all sustain together the social scaffolding of norms and 
accountability in which resentment plays a central role as, in Butler’s 
words, “a weapon, put into our hands by nature, against injury, 
injustice, and cruelty” of which we ourselves need not be a victim 
(Butler 1970 [1726], 76). The scope of resentment well exceeds moral 
boundaries, but its enforcement of moral boundaries is its most 
important job.  
 
What others do in affirming moral boundaries, assigning 
responsibility, and standing with victims affects the terms on which 
victims choose to forgive or not to forgive. They can make it easier or 
more difficult, safer or more risky, or more a release than a burden for 
the victim. Victims may indeed have their own reasons for this choice 
in their moral convictions, their faith, or their personal history with the 
wrongdoer. But it often matters whether the victim is validated and 
vindicated by others, whether the victim receives confirmation from 
others that their own sense of grievance is justified, and whether the 
victim finds that others are willing to impose rebukes and demands on 
the offender. Being validated and vindicated by others can reasonably 
affect the victim’s decision whether to relinquish further demands on 
the offender. A victim whose experience is denied or slighted, or who 
finds the offender enjoys protection that amounts to impunity, or who 
realizes that he or she (the victim) is not the kind of person the 
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community will defend or protect, might still forgive, but he or she has 
distinctive reasons to take care in doing so.  
 
When the victim is not supported by others, the victim must be 
concerned, for example, about whether forgiving would seem like 
condoning or caving in, inviting the contempt or further abuse of the 
wrongdoer. Unsupported by others, the victim may need to lay claim 
to his worth emphatically “in social space” as a matter of principle, as 
a call for others’ support. When others do not respond to that call, the 
victim can be locked into the need for protest. The victim cannot afford 
to forgive. Conversely, unequivocal communal validation and 
vindication (when others appropriately rebuke a wrongdoer, or apply 
other sanctions) can free the victim to be more generous or hopeful, 
allowing the victim to feel free to forgive. Third parties can also 
contribute to the victim’s and the offender’s understanding of the 
wrong and its consequences. A victim might need time, but also help, 
in seeing what she has suffered in perspective and context; to see the 
wrongdoer clearly; to shore up her sense of self-respect and justified 
anger; to refuse to condone a wrong; or to forgive in the face of social 
disapproval. A wrongdoer might need others to combat her own 
denial, evasion, or excuses; to explain what the victim is going 
through; or to understand whether there are amends that could be 
made and whether it is too soon or too late to attempt them. Third 
parties can, of course, make prospects of forgiveness worse, but they 
can also make them better.9  
 
As defenders of 3PF like to emphasize, third parties are in a 
position to make their own judgments about wrongs, the responsibility 
of wrongdoers, and their own responsibilities to victims. They have 
“choices of moral significance” to make about wrongs done to others 
(Radzik 2010, 82). They face choices to rebuke or avoid wrongdoers, 
or to support the wrongdoer’s reacceptance or rehabilitation, whatever 
the victim does. I have already suggested that their choices may well 
have consequences for what the victim does, and that is part of the 
moral complexity of their position. Defenders of 3PF seem especially 
concerned with grudging victims who refuse to forgive repentant and 
deserving wrongdoers, and with stranded wrongdoers who can no 
longer pursue forgiveness from a victim who is dead. Here there are 
important tasks for third parties in responding to remorseful offenders 
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who struggle without forgiveness: to witness repentance; to encourage 
and affirm improvement; to advise or console; or to help reign in guilt 
or shame that is excessive, self-defeating, or self-indulgent. None of 
these is, or requires, 3PF.  
 
On the side of a morally aware and remorseful offender, there is 
an echo of the victim’s costs: if we do not succumb to self-deception, 
we all have to live with the wrongs we have done, how we have hurt 
others, and what it says about who we are. Even if we are now better, 
wiser, or changed people, we are still the person who did what we did 
and who was capable of doing it. Keeping hold of this inescapable fact, 
we can hope, is a resource for making better choices in the future, and 
for clearer understanding, if not greater compassion, toward others 
who do wrong. But however “forgiving” (as we do say) is the stance 
third parties take toward someone who has wronged another, it is not 
what the victim of wrong decides to do in forgiving, for third parties do 
not have the victim’s costs to absorb.  
 
There are hard and complex cases involving intercommunal or 
intergroup conflict, or the situations of victims who have been grossly 
mistreated based on their membership in a group that is targeted for 
abuse. In cases of extended intergroup conflict, there are many 
wrongs done to individuals by individuals, but cycles of retaliation can 
render the categories of victim and wrongdoer unclear. Decisions by 
individuals to forgive or not to forgive in some cases involving groups 
may carry, or may seem to carry, implications beyond the individuals 
involved. It might be true that wrongs one has individually suffered 
are so bound to one’s identification as a member of an ethnic, racial, 
religious, or political community, that one cannot avoid having one’s 
own decision to forgive or not to forgive appear to “represent” others. 
This may be a moral obstacle to forgiveness in some cases, as a victim 
might not feel it is simply and separately her own to give; but it might 
add larger meaning to the choice to forgive or not to forgive. At the 
same time, there are temptations in these cases for groups or 
communities to burden the individual victim of wrong – the woman 
raped in group vengeance or the father of the victim of a political 
murder – with the community’s hatred or with its hope for peace or 
reconciliation. The “victim’s prerogative” can be an important principle 
here for all concerned. It is also true that the understanding of “the 
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victim” – the one wronged and seriously harmed – will almost certainly 
vary with different cultural assumptions. If some of us find it natural to 
see members of the immediate family of a murder victim as fellow 
victims, the social or kin understandings of others might extend that 
category differently or more widely. This is all only to say, however, 
that who the victim is, and what it means for victims to forgive, is not 
always obvious. It is not to say that those other than victims are in a 
position to forgive.  
 
Having seen (all too briefly and schematically) what it is up to 
third parties to decide and to do, I want to return to the victim’s 
situation. We still need to broaden the picture of the emotional costs of 
wrongdoing to victims. In particular, I want to dislodge the grip of the 
wrong/resentment/payback-or-forgiveness motif that has so 
dominated philosophical thinking about forgiveness and other 
responses to wrongs. The idea that righteous anger is the 
characteristic and natural response, and perhaps the rational, virtuous, 
or morally sound response, to being the victim of wrong has exerted a 
powerful hold on Western philosophical thinking about forgiveness. 
Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of good temper has it as a mean 
between irascibility and the other extreme without a name, in which 
the one wronged is a “fool” who is “thought unlikely to defend himself; 
and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one’s friends is 
slavish.”10  
 
The idea that wrongs prompt (and should prompt) reproving 
anger continues to dominate most discussions of forgiveness, and the 
definition of “overcoming resentment” continues often to be treated as 
the default definition of forgiving.11 This is arguably one way that 
accounts of forgiveness are gender-inflected, if only because the 
“right” response is one that is culturally the “manly” one.12 This is also 
a way that many accounts of forgiveness are incomplete or distorting 
for men and women alike, for serious wrongs take their emotional toll 
in many ways. Pettigrove acknowledges this, but his extended list of 
emotional reactions involves “anger, hatred, loathing, contempt, and 
scorn,” that is, all combative, hostile emotions (Pettigrove 2009, 590). 
Hieronymi, on the other hand, recognizes her account is limited by not 
addressing cases in which forgiveness involves “disappointment, 
sadness, or frustration” (Hieronymi 2001, 553). My point is entirely 
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obvious once made: victims’ responses to serious wrongs (not to 
mention terrible forms of mistreatment and violence) include, even 
frequently, disappointment, sadness, and heartbreak; helplessness, 
hopelessness, grief, and despair; shock, fear, rage, hatred, terror, and 
anguish; disgust and contempt; and guilt, humiliation, and shame. 
One compendium of crime victim statements includes these feelings, 
as well as “shattering, howling pain” and “visceral, animal anguish” 
(Zehr 2001, 26 and 48).13  
 
To understand what is at stake in forgiving serious or terrible 
injuries, one needs to understand especially the roles of grief, despair, 
fear, mistrust, humiliation, and shame. The fact that a wrongdoer has 
retracted the insult to the victim implied by the wrong, or that third 
parties stand up decisively for the victim, might indeed answer the 
victim’s protest of resentment in constructive ways. But what of grief 
at dealing with lost years and opportunities (in wrongful imprisonment, 
or in a marriage that turns out to have been based on deceit); or 
terror at a world turned malignant by torture or rape; or despair at the 
murder or disappearance of a child? There are also profound emotional 
experiences that do not fit neatly into packaged categories, such as 
the experience of being “haunted” by those lost to violence, or feeling 
“already dead” after the genocide or the concentration camp.14 Nor are 
such experiences confined to the most extreme cases; everyday 
betrayals, criminal victimization, and lives torn apart by the 
consequences of others’ negligence can leave staggering emotional 
costs, alongside physical, material, and social ones. These emotional 
“costs” can warp or rend the victim’s everyday existence, yet they are 
ones that the offender can barely touch, and for which others can only 
provide consolation.  
 
Humiliation and shame deserve special attention. While the link 
between retaliation and anger seems to go without saying, humiliation 
and shame are powerful drivers of a need “get even.” The anger or 
rage behind cycles of retaliatory violence, for example, may be rooted 
in shame, and by the need to prove to oneself as well as to others that 
one is not the lowly, miserable, contemptible object of another’s will.15 
Victims of personal betrayal can be ashamed at being of negligible 
concern to one whom they loved, and ashamed before others for being 
used or duped. Victims of criminal and political wrongs report shame 
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at being singled out for mistreatment by a stranger; at being helpless; 
at being reduced to the appearance of something less than human or 
to the behavior of an animal; and self-blame at surviving when others 
did not, or when they feel they did not do enough. This is all to drive 
home the point that mastering, containing, or absorbing the “costs” of 
grave or terrible wrongs, even just in the emotional sphere, is an 
arduous achievement that ordinary people nonetheless often do. That 
forgiveness of grave wrongs typically requires this feat draws a bright 
line between victims and all others even in the milder cases.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
I have labored here over the idea of 3PF, which is not, after all, 
a majority view. Understanding what is wrong with it, though, is worth 
the effort. It is too easy to dismiss the claim that there is third party 
forgiveness as a contradiction or incoherence. What we really need is 
to understand what goes on in forgiveness, how it involves an unstable 
mix of action and passion, and why it is hard. Only then can we see 
why it is to the credit of the victim of wrong to find his or her way to 
lay down just demands and navigate powerful feelings, even as the 
victim’s ability to do this can be deeply affected by the decisions and 
responses of others.  
 
I prefer to describe forgiveness not as “overcoming resentment” 
but as the victim’s making a practical commitment (either deliberate 
decision or by stages) to release the wrongdoer from further 
grievance, reproach, and direct demands to which the victim may yet 
be entitled (Walker 2006b, 151–190). In any case of serious wrong, 
this commitment will require the victim to refrain from trying to place 
remaining costs and damages on the offender to “pay” or relieve, and 
accepting the task of absorbing those costs. This characterization can 
capture a wide variety of cases which might or might not involve 
overcoming resentment or other negative feelings; restoring 
relationship with the offender; reevaluating or reframing the offender; 
or placing the wrong firmly in the past. Each of these is central to 
some cases; none of these is essential to all. They are all things that 
forgiveness might entail, and they are things that might be seen as 
tasks for others as well, but the victim’s assumption of costs is 
something that no one else can do.16 
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Notes 
1 Radzik 2010 offers an argument similar to Pettigrove’s, based on supposed 
similarities between the experiences and situations of victims of 
wrongs and others who are not victims. Maclachlan n. d. offers a more 
complex account, which requires a special situation of sympathy and 
caring identification of the third party. Norlock 2009 also supports third 
party forgiveness, but Norlock stretches the understanding of victim 
forgiveness in some otherwise controversial ways. Griswold 2007 says 
he allows “third party forgiveness,” but he means by it forgiving in 
place of someone  else who is indisputably a victim, rather than 
forgiving a wrong done to another on one’s own part. My discussion 
deals entirely with human interpersonal forgiveness of wrongs people 
do to each other. I do not take up forgiveness by God, although I 
doubt that it would be seen in those traditions to which it is central as 
a case of third party forgiveness. Nor do I discuss self-forgiveness 
here, but I accept the implication that if my argument against 3PF cuts 
against self-forgiveness as well, or allows self-forgiveness to be 
“forgiveness” only by analogy or metaphor, I accept that implication.   
2 The three arguments Pettigrove attempts to rebut closely track those offered 
by Govier and Verwoerd 2002.  
 
3 Strawson 1968, 74-77, contrasts resentment as a “non-detached” reactive 
attitude that “the offended person might naturally or normally be 
expected to feel” (77), with indignation as an analogous but 
“sympathetic or vicarious or impersonal or disinterested or 
generalized” feeling toward wrongs done to others (84). This has 
become a default position in philosophical discussions. A common 
reference for this widespread contemporary view is Murphy and 
Hampton 1988. I present an extensive critique of the claim that 
resentment is necessarily self-referring in Walker 2006b. Pettigrove 
returns (as I do) to the classic discussion of Bishop Joseph Butler 1970 
[1726], who understands resentment as a “fellow feeling,” not 
confined to injury to oneself. Butler does, however, confines proper 
resentment to injury and injustice, as I do not.   
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4 Radzik 2010 acknowledges that third parties who expressly announce their 
forgiveness to  wrongdoers are apt to receive a hostile response to 
what might seem to them a “passive-aggressive punishment more 
than gift of compassion;” so she suggests that third party forgivers 
might well “refrain from explicitly declaring the forgiveness they 
justifiably and virtuously feel” (81). This is a curious result, as is 
Radzik’s claim that third parties may forgive although they have no 
claims to apology or reparations on their own behalf (78).  
 
5 Hieronymi does not take up unilateral forgiveness, where apology or 
repentance is not on offer; nor does she take up self-forgiveness or 
forgiveness in the grip of emotions such as “disappointment, sadness, 
or frustration rather than resentment” (553).   
6 Social worlds have existed in which honor codes among an elite make insult 
easy to do and deadly to pay for. In some places, they still exist. On 
the erosion of such worlds of potentially deadly scorekeeping, see 
Appiah 2010.   
7 See Walker 2006b, 133 and 146-47, on how being able to feel oneself a 
competent normative judge can be at stake in wielding resentment, 
and how resentment at changes in the shared norms of a community 
can give rise to resentments at feeling alienated, no longer a 
competent “one of us.”  
 
8 See Walker 2006b, 133-36, on the social reality that not everyone in every 
circumstance is able to publicly threaten just anyone else. Butler was 
wrong to think that everyone equally can take up these “arms.”   
9 For a sobering account of intense communal pressure not to reconcile or 
forgive across groups, see Halpern and Weinstein 2004. See also Clark 
2010, 308–341, who claims that church leaders and Christian belief 
have been effective in encouraging reconciliation in postgenocide 
Rwanda.   
10 Aristotle 1980, 97.  
 
11 See Walker 2006b, 154-158, for reasons that this description will not do.  
 
12 Norlock 2009 explores the ways forgiveness, in concept and practice, is 
gendered.   
13See also Walker 2006a on the consequences of oversimplifying victim’s 
reactions.  
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14 These descriptions are common in Holocaust and Rwandan genocide 
testimony. See, for example, Langer 1991, Hatzfeld 2005. See also 
Hamber 2009, 75–93.   
15 Scheff 1994 gives an account of shame as the “master emotion” in driving 
violent reprisal.   
16 My thanks to all participants in the “Possibilities of Forgiveness” Conference 
organized by Jesse Couenhaven at Villanova University in February, 
2012, which provided an extraordinarily nuanced examination of our 
differences surrounding what forgiveness is and does. Thanks also to 
Aline Kalbian for the invitation to present a version of the paper to the 
Department of Religion at Florida State University, and to the audience 
of faculty and graduate students for rich comments and challenges.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
